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I welcome the opportunity to speak with the Committee
today about Senate Resolution 400 and the allocation of
Congressional oversight responsibilities concerning the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The resolution, of

course, would establish a single committee of the Senate
with oversight and appropriations jurisdiction over the
FBI.

I approach with deference in making any suggestion

about internal Senate policy.

However, I have already

testified at length on February 6 before the Senate
Government Operations Committee on this same subject,
and I will be taking the same position today that I did
then.

I believe the internal institutional arrangements

in the Senate and House of Representatives will have a
significant impact both upon the work of the FBI and upon
the quality of the Congress' important oversight function.
I would like to begin with a few brief observations.
Senate Resolution 400 would,

in effect, split off

for purposes of oversight and debate on appropriations
the intelligence units with the Bureau--the units engaged
in domestic security, foreign counter-intelligence and
foreign intelligence investigations--from all other units
in the Bureau.

I believe that this separation would be a

mistake for several reasons.
First, as I have said before,

the domestic security

investigations of the Bureau should be tied closely with
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the criminal law.

The FBI guidelines in this area, which

will soon be going into effect on a trial basis, seek to
require this connection by authorizing domestic security
investigations only into conduct which involves or will
involve violence and the violation of the federal law.
A similar point can be made about the Bureau's counterintelligence responsibilities.

Though these investigations

into the espionage and terrorist activities of foreign
powers and political organizations sometimes for a variety
of reasons do not lead to prosecution,

they are essentially

connected to federal criminal statutes relating to espionagE
and terrorism.
The Bureau's discipline of perceiving its intelligence
functions as closely connected to the federal criminal law
is important in that it is a reminder of the need--so
clearly seen in ordinary criminal cases because of the
ultimate scrutiny of the courts--carefully to protect
individual rights,

Congressional oversight arrangements

that would split off the intelligence functions from the
more ordinary law enforcement functions of the Bureau
would tend to diminish the force of this perception.
In the positive foreign intelligence area--concerned
with the collection of useful information about foreign
powers--the Bureau's role has been a derivative one.
The Bureau, with the authorization of the Attorney General,
at the request of other intelligence agencies does some
positive foreign intelligence collection and also supports
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other agencies' foreign intelligence operations.

Because

of the derivative nature of this type investigation, some
Bureau activities would doubtlessly come under the scrutiny
of an oversight committee responsible for the intelligence
agencies which request Bureau assistance.

This could be

accomplished without going so far as to transfer oversight

I

or appropriations jurisdiction over any Bureau activities
to an intelligence

co~nittee.

A second reason I believe any such transfer would be
a mistake is that not only should the Bureau perceive
itself and be perceived as a single law enforcement
organization, but it should also be viewed as part of the
Department of Justice,

the oversight of all other aspects

of which is vested in the Judiciary Committee.
A third, and related reason, is that a single committee
with oversight and appropriations jurisdiction will develop
an expertness about the Bureau and the Department of Justice
of which it is a part.

The activities of the Bureau even

in the intelligence area are fundamentally interrelated
I

with the activities of other parts of the Department of
Justice.

In the development and nurture of expertness, an

understanding and concern about one part cannot be separated
from an understanding and concern about the other.
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Finally,

there is always the risk if there is a

mUltiplicity of committees with oversight responsibilities
over a single agency that each committee will learn
something about the activities of the agency but no
committee will learn enough.
For these reasons, I believe it would be unwise to
vest, as Senate Resolution 400 would, the oversight and
appropriation jurisdiction concerning the Federal Bureau
of Investigation in a separate intelligence
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co~nittee.

